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INTRODUCION

The "Fire Statute," enacted as section one of the Limitation
of Liability Act of 1851,1 exonerates a shipowner from liability for
fire loss to cargo except where the fire was caused by his "design or
neglect."' 2 For more than three quarters of a century, the statute
provided the shipowner with the sole protection from liability for
fire and loss. Then, in 1936, Congress enacted the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA),3 which provided a more comprehensive scheme of carrier liability limitation.4 Section 4(2)(b) of

COGSA, in particular, provided an exemption from liability for
loss or damage to goods due to fire except where caused by the
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law;, A.B., Fordham
University, 1939; LL.B., Fordham Law School, 1942; LL.M., New York University, 1949;
formerly associated with Alexander, Ash & Schwartz, Esqs.; Deputy Counsel and Counsel,
Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, 1952-1973; Member, Maritime Law Association of the
United States.
1 Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-188
(1976)).
2 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976). The Fire Statute provides:
No owner of any vessel shall be liable to answer for or make good to any
person any loss or damage, which may happen to any merchandise whatsoever,
which shall be shipped, taken in, or put on board any such vessel, by reason or by
means of any fire happening to or on board the vessel, unless such fire is caused
by the design or neglect of such owner.
3 Act of April 16, 1936, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315
(1976)).
4 See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMRrALTY §§ 3-22 to 3-37 (2d ed.
1975).
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carrier's "actual fault or privity."5 The new legislation expressly

provided, however, that a carrier's rights and obligations under the
Fire Statute were to be unaffected.' Most importantly, COGSA imposed, on every carrier covered by the legislation, a duty to exercise due diligence to make his ship seaworthy.7 The failure to satisfy this duty of due diligence expressly precluded the carrier from
obtaining the liability exemption contained in section 4(1) of
COGSA.8
Section 4(2)(b), the fire exemption clause of COGSA, however,
contained no express requirement of due diligence., Nonetheless,
the question arose whether the fire exemption clause was subject
to the carrier's obligation to exercise due diligence to make his vessel seaworthy. This question had arisen, prior to the enactment of
COGSA, under the Fire Statute and was rejected by the Supreme
Court. 10 Since the Fire Statute and the fire exemption clause were
to exist side-by-side, the early court decisions refused to read a due
diligence requirement into the fire exemption clause, and equated
"actual fault or privity" with "design or neglect."11 Recently, in
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 2 the
Ninth Circuit held that the fire exemption clause is subject to an
overriding obligation-the carrier's duty to exercise due diligence
to make his ship seaworthy. 13 Moreover, and notwithstanding
nearly 150 years of established judicial precedent, the Sunkist
court held that the failure to exercise due diligence to make his
vessel seaworthy deprives the carrier of the protection of the Fire
4
1

Statute.

This Article will examine the departure which Sunkist has
taken from the traditional learning. Commencing with a discussion
of the origins of the Fire Statute and COGSA, the Article will focus upon the standards which must be satisfied to obtain the benefits of the Fire Statute and the COGSA fire exemption. With this
background, a careful and detailed analysis will be made of the
46 U.S.C.
6 46 U.S.C.
7 46 U.S.C.
46 U.S.C.

§ 1304(2)(b) (1976); see note 41 infra.
§ 1308 (1976); see note 42 infra.
§ 1303(1)(a) (1976).
§ 1304(1)(1976).

o See note 42 infra.
10 Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1932).
" See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
12 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
13 603 F.2d at 1341.
4

Id.
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Sunkist decision and the legal precedent upon which it is based.
Finally, the Article will examine the ramifications which the Sunkist decision is likely to have on maritime insurance and time
charterers.
ORIGINS OF THE FIRE STATUTE AND THE
CLAUSE

COGSA

FIRE EXEMPTON

During the infancy of our merchant marine, United States
courts refused to accept any method of limiting shipowner liability.15 Accordingly, our shipowners were unable to compete with

British and Continental shipping since, even before the American
Revolution, the latter had been protected by broad schemes of
shipowner liability limitation.16 The infamous burning of the Lexington and the litigation that ensued, however, brought congressional attention to the plight of our merchant marine.' 7 In order to
erase the disadvantage faced by American shippers,' 8 Congress, in
1851, enacted the Limitation of Liability Act (the Act).' 9 The primary provision of the Act limited a shipowner's liability to the
value of his interest in the vessel and the freight then pending
20
when the loss occurred without his "privity or knowledge.
15 See, e.g., New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 383
(1848); The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373 (C.C.D. Me. 1831) (No. 11,619). See generally

Lugenbuhl, Limitation of Liability in ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASS'N & AM. TRIAL LAwYERS
ASS'N, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ADmIRALTY LAw 108 (1966).
16 FLORIDA BAR, MARrmE LAW AND PRACTCE § 10.1 (1980).

17See New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 378-79
(1848). In Merchants' Bank, the Lexington, en route from New York to Connecticut, was
destroyed by fire. See id. at 378-79. A wooden crate marked "contents unknown" was lost as
a result of the fire. Id. at 379-80. It was discovered subsequently that the box contained
$18,000. Id. The court held the shipowner liable despite a contractual provision placing the
risk of loss on the shipper. Id. at 385. It was this harsh result that directly prompted enactment of the Limitation of Liability Act. See generally Note, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old Doctrine, 16 STAN.L. REV. 370 (1964).
16 Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150 (1957); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing,
347 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1954); 23 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 776 (1851).
19 Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-196
(1976)).
20 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976). As presently codified, section 3 of the Limitation of Liability
Act provides in part:
(a) Privity or knowledge of owner; limitation The liability of the owner of any
vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by
any person of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of
such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter,
or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the
privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases pro-
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Where the loss was caused by fire, however, another section of the
Act, known as the "Fire Statute," exonerated the vessel owner
from liability unless the fire was caused by the shipowner's "design
or neglect."21
The considerations which led Congress to enact the Fire Statute are not difficult to discern. Fire was one of the principal
hazards to which the maritime venture was subjected, since automatic sprinklers and stream smothering devices were unknown in
1851. Therefore, a fire at sea, once started, was especially difficult
to control. Moreover, since the sail vessel was then in vogue and
the safer steam vessel was not yet in commercial use, maritime entrepreneurs were afraid to invest large sums of money in shipping.
A catapult was needed to vault a -competitive American shipping
industry onto the international scene. Thus, the 1851 Act was enacted to encourage investment in American shipping by affording
our domestic merchant marine with the same protections enjoyed
by shipowners of other maritime nations.22 The American statute,
however, did not go as far as the original English Fire Statute of
178623 which provided for unconditional exoneration from liability,
without exception for the owner's "design or neglect."24
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, European
shippers began to insert exculpatory clauses in their bills of lading
vided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976).
,1 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976); see note 2 supra. The constitutionality of the provision was
upheld in Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1883). As
far as its scope is concerned, the exoneration provision applies only to shipboard fires and
has no application to those fires occurring on shore. See Constable v. National S.S. Co., 154
U.S. 51, 59 (1894). Accordingly, many contracts include an exemption clause for damages
resulting from fire before and after loading. These clauses are upheld if the fire is not caused
by the negligence of the vessel owner. See id. at 79. Furthermore, the Fire Statute may bje
invoked only where damage to the cargo was caused by the ignition or combustion of materials from which a fire ensued. Damage caused by heat alone is not within the ambit of the
statute. See The Buckeye State, 39 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D.N.Y. 1941). The statute does
apply to foreign and domestic vessels, The "Scotland," 105 U.S. 24, 31 (1881), and, under 46
U.S.C. § 188 (1976), the statute applies to all vessels used on lakes and rivers. In re Garnett,
141 U.S. 1, 11 (1891).
"' See Lugenbuhl, supra note 15, at 110; Springer, Amendments to the FederalLaw
Limiting the Liability of Shipowners, 11 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 14, 14 (1936).
" See 26 Geo. 3, c. 86 (1786).
" Id. Although the original English Fire Statute was more liberal than the American
Fire Statute, the English law subsequently fell more into line with the American approach.
See Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60.
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which exonerated them from all liability for cargo damage.2 5 The
purpose of these clauses was to circumvent the general maritime
law which regarded carriers as insurers, hence, imposing absolute
liability 26 upon them for cargo damage.27 American courts, however, held such clauses to be violative of public policy 2 8 As a result, British carriers were able to use such exculpatory clauses to
gain competitive advantage over American carriers in the form of
lower shipping charges.29 In an effort to remove this new competitive disadvantage to American shipping, without sacrificing the
policies served by the general maritime law, Congress enacted the
Harter Act of 1893.30 This legislation made it unlawful for a carrier

to exonerate himself fully for liability based on his own fault. 1 A
25

See A. KNAUTH, OCEAN BILLs OF LADING 118-19 (4th ed. 1953). An example of an

exemption from liability typically found on the back of a bill of lading was the "exception of
rust," which provided that the carrier was not to be cast in liability for damage to merchandise caused by rust. G. GuamoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, § 3-23.
28 Losses or damages occasioned by acts of God or the public enemy, however, were
exceptions to the general maritime rule that the carrier was an insurer. See G. GU.MoRE & C.
BLACK, supra note 4,

§

3-22; A. KNAUTH, supra note 25, at 116.

The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 23 (1858); see The Main v.
Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894).
28 E.g., Liverpool and Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 441 (1889);
A. KNAUTH, supra note 25, at 118.
29 British courts historically had upheld exculpatory clauses in bills of lading. See G.
GmMORE & C. BLACK, supranote 4, § 3-23; Note, Limitations on Liabilityfor Negligence in
Documents of Title, 32 NuB. L. Rav. 600, 601 (1953). Consequently, "American ship owning
interests [were not operating] on a competitive basis with British interests insofar as limitation of liability was concerned." Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603
F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
30 Act of Feb. 13, 1893, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196
(1976)). The Harter Act was enacted, in part, to eradicate the dominance of British shipping
caused by such freedom from liability. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines,
603 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980). Nevertheless, the Act
was not intended to shield carriers from all liability. See Koppers Conn. Coke Co. v. James
McWilliams Blue Line, Inc., 89 F.2d 865, 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 706 (1937).
Indeed, the Act balances the interests of carriers desirous of freedom from negligence liability and of shippers who would hold the carriers strictly liable. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
96 (1970).
31 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1976). The Harter Act prohibits shipowners or their privy from
inserting clauses in bills of lading which exculpate them from liability for negligence or
other malfeasance. Id.; see Levatino Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 233 F. Supp.
697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 337 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1964); Norjac Trading Corp. v. The
Mathilda Thorden, 173 F. Supp. 23, 27 (E.D. Pa. 1959). Clauses which limit the duty to
equip and load vessels properly or which limit the obligation to exercise due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy are also unlawful and void. 46 U.S.C. § 191 (1976); see The Carib
Prince, 170 U.S. 655, 660-61 (1898); The Willdomino, 300 F. 5 (3d Cir. 1924), cert. dismissed, 270 U.S. 641 (1925). One commentator summarized the Act and its ramifications by
27
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shipowner who exercised due diligence to make his vessel seaworthy, however, was exempted by the Harter Act from all liability
resulting from navigational or management errors.3 2 Significantly,
the Harter Act did not exonerate a carrier from liability for fire
loss.33 Thus, the Fire Statute remained as the sole protection to
American shipowners from liability for loss due to fire.
Where the Harter Act was inapplicable, the persistence of carriers to insert limitation of liability clauses in their bills of lading
led the International Maritime Committee to enact the Hague
Rules of 1921,4 which embodied the general principles of the Harter Act.3 5 The Hague Rules, however, were purely voluntary,3 6 and
did not obtain the force of law in this country until 1936 when
Congress enacted COGSA.37 The principal objective of COGSA was
to continue the major provisions of the Harter Act, thereby protecting carriers from excessive liability while discouraging carrier
stating that it permits the shipowner to escape liability only if he uses due diligence to make
his ship seaworthy. See CANFiELD & DALZELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA, 122-23 (1937). If he does
not "bargain" to escape liability on these terms, he cannot limit his liability at all, and he
assumes an absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. It should be noted that the
Harter Act was largely superseded by COGSA, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976), except with
respect to inland transportation, and the period before the cargo is loaded aboard the vessel
and the period after discharge of the cargo until its proper delivery. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300,
1311 (1976); Isthmian S.S. Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 290 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir.
1961), modified on rehearing, 300 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1962).
3- 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976). See also 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300, 1304(2)(a) (1976); Orient MidEast Lines, Inc. v. Shipment of Rice on Board S.S. Orient Transp., 496 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. MN Captayonnis "S", 451
F.2d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972).
'3 Earle & Stoddart, Inc., v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420, 427 (1932).
"' A. KNAUrrH, supra note 25, at 126. After a series of maritime conferences, the Hague
rules were revised and given legal effect in the International Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931. The
United States expressed adherence to this convention with the passage of COGSA, Act of
April 16, 1936, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1208 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976)).
" Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976); Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc. v. S/S Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 964 (1970). The Hague rules established "uniform ocean bills of lading to govern the
rights and liabilities of carriers and shippers inter se in international trade." Herd & Co. v.
Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 301 (1959). As such, the rules were intended to balance
the interests of carriers and shippers. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S/S Hong Kong
Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970). Thus, the rules
cannot be used by carriers as a complete shield from liability. Accord, Pan-Am Trade &
Credit Corp. v. The Campfire, 156 F.2d 603, 605-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774
(1946).
30 A. KNAUTH, supra note 25, at 126.
'3
Act of April 16, 1936, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1208 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 13001315 (1976)); see Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976).
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negligence or indifference.35 Thus, conditioned upon due diligence,
section 4(2)(a) of COGSA exonerated carriers from liability resulting from navigational or management errors.39 The limitations of
liability contained in COGSA, however, are far more comprehensive than those contained in both the Harter Act and the Limitation of Liability Act.40 The most important of the COGSA liability
exemptions, for purposes of this Article, is contained in section
4(2)(b), which exonerates the carrier from loss due to fire except
where "caused by [his] actual fault or privity.' 41 Notably, section 8

of COGSA expressly preserved the carrier's rights and obligations
under the Fire Statute.42 Thus, as the state of the law now stands,
two distinct statutes, each containing its own standard of care, provide for exoneration from liability for fire loss. A shipowner is exempt from liability due to fire loss under the Fire Statute-absent
his "design or neglect, ' 43 and under the fire exemption clause of
' '44
COGSA-absent his "actual fault or privity.

The coexistence of the Fire Statute and the fire exemption
clause of COGSA raises two significant issues. First, the question
arises as to how these statutes were intended to interrelate. Second, there has been an inquiry into whether the fire exemption
clause incorporates the due diligence standard of section 4(1) of
COGSA.45 Before addressing these questions, however, it is helpful
"I See Tessler Bros. (B.C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1974);
General Elec. Co. v. MN Lady Sophie, 458 F. Supp. 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
39 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976). Section 4(2)(a) provides: "Neither the carrier nor the
ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from-(a) Act, neglect, or
default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the
management of the ship ...
." Id.
'1 Compare 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976) with 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976) and 46 U.S.C. §§ 181183 (1976).
41 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976). Section 4(2)(b) provides: "Neither the carrier nor the
ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from-(b) Fire, unless
caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier .....
Id.
42 45 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976). Section 1308 provides in pertinent part- "The provisions of
[the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act] shall not affect the rights and obligations of the carrier
under the provisions of the [Fire Statute] ...
"Id.
43 See note 2 supra.
4"See note 41 supra.
45 46 U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976). Under section 3 of COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), the
carrier has an obligation both "before and at the beginning of the voyage," to, inter alia, use
due diligence to make his ship seaworthy and to "[p]roperly man, equip, and supply the
ship." § 1303(a) & (b). So long as the carrier satisfies these obligations he will be immune
from liability under section 4(1) of COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976), which provides in
part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or
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to examine the judicial interpretations of both the "design or neglect" standard of the Fire Statute and the "actual fault or privity"
standard of the fire exemption clause.
THE FIRE STATUTE STANDARD

As seen earlier in this Article, the Fire Statute was enacted in
1851 as part of the Limitation of Liability Act.40 The core section

of the Act allowed a shipowner to limit his liability for loss occasioned or incurred without his "privity or knowledge.

' 47

Where the

loss is due to fire, however, the Fire Statute applies, and the exemption from liability is complete absent the owner's "design or
neglect."48 Not surprisingly, shortly after the Act was enacted, the
question arose whether the "privity or knowledge" language contained in the Act imposed a stricter standard than the "design or
neglect" phraseology of the Fire Statute.49 Since the modem tendency is to treat the two standards as synonymous, 50 it is important to examine the development of each.
As one would suspect, the "privity or knowledge" clause has
been the subject of a plethora of interpretations.5 1 Indeed, one
commentator has noted:
Judicial attitudes shape the meaning of such catch-word
phrases for successive generations. In the heyday of the Limitation Act it seemed as hard to pin "privity or knowledge" on the
petitioning shipowner as it is thought to be for the camel to pass
through the needle's eye. To the extent that in our own or a subsequent generation the philosophy of the Limitation Act is found
less appealing, that attitude will be implemented by a relaxed attitude toward what constitutes "privity or knowledge," "design or
neglect." 52

resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part
of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly
manned, equipped, and supplied ....
"' See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
4746 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979); see note 20 supra.
" See note 2 supra.
" See, e.g., Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 601-02
(1883).
50 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 836 (1947), wherein the court stated that the negligence test "is the same as is the
test of 'privity, or knowledge.'" Id. at 664.
"1See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, at § 10-20.
52

Id.
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One of the first judicial interpretations of the "privity or knowledge" clause emphasized some fault or negligent act attributable to
the owner. 5s According to this early definition, "knowledge" required an owner's failure to take action appropriate to the circumstances to avert a loss or damage when he knew or should have
known that the circumstances required such action." Hence, the
limitation statute worked for the benefit of the owner. He reaped
the Act's benefits when he was personally blameless even though
his employees may have been at fault in the performance of their
duties.55 Thus, while an owner was fully liable for his own conduct,
he had only limited liability for the acts or omissions of others, and
was completely exonerated if no negligence could be shown by the
master or members of his crew. The concept of personal fault or
negligence on the part of the owner continues to be an essential
element of the privity or knowledge standard.
In 1932, the Supreme Court first interpreted the "design or
neglect" language of the Fire Statute in the case of Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd. 56 In Earle, a vessel was
held exempt from liability under the Fire Statute despite the
ship's being rendered unseaworthy before departure due to the
63 Lord v. Goodall, Nelson & Perkins S.S. Co., 15 F. Cas. 884 (C.C. Cal. 1877) (No.
8,506), aff'd, 102 U.S. 541 (1881). In Lord, Judge Sawyer stated that:
As used in the statute, the meaning of the words "privity or knowledge," evidently, is a personal participation of the owner in some fault, or act of negligence,
causing or contributing to the loss, or some personal knowledge or means of
knowledge, of which he is bound to avail himself of a contemplated loss, or of a
condition of things likely to produce or contribute to the loss, without adopting
appropriate means to prevent it. There must be some personal concurrence, or
some fault or negligence on the part of the owner himself, or in which he personally participates, to constitute such privity, within the meaning of the act, as will
exclude him from the benefit of its provisions.
15 F. Cas. at 887.
54 See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908);
Greater New Orleans Express. Comm'n v. Tug Claribel, 222 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1963),
aff'd sub nom. Coleman v. Jahncke Serv., 341 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 974 (1966).
See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 1969); McDonald v. The 204, 194 F. Supp. 383, 390-91 (S.D. Ala. 1961). In McDonald, the court stated
that, although the owner is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for his employees' negligence, he nevertheless may limit his liability pursuant to section 183. Id. at 390.
Limitation of liability, however, presupposes the owner's lack either of privity or knowledge
of his employees' negligence. Id. at 391. In order for the shipowner to limit his liability,
however, he must use reasonable care in the selection of his master, officers, and crew. See,
e.g., Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Szwed, 154 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1946); W.E. Valliant & Co. v.
Rayonier, 140 F.2d 589 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 748 (1944).
" 287 U.S. 420 (1932).
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negligent stowage of coal in her bunkers by the chief engineer. 7 In
reaching its decision, the Earle Court determined that the statutory phrase "neglect of such owner" meant the personal negligence
of the owner and, in the case of a corporate owner, 58 it meant only
the negligence of its managing officers or agents to whom the
corporation had delegated the inspection and decision making
processes.59 Thus, the Court reasoned that the negligence of the
chief engineer or other ship officers, including the master, did not
on the basis of respondeat superior deprive the owner of the statutory exoneration from liability.6 0 Moreover, the Court held that the
statutory immunity applied even though the vessel was in fact unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage."1 Thus, the Fire
67 Id. at 424, 429.
A corporate shipowner's privity or knowledge is, necessarily, that of its employees.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 495 F.2d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1974). Whether such privity
or knowledge will be imputed to the corporate owner-thereby depriving the corporate owner of the protections of the Fire Statute-is dependent upon the position of the employee
within the corporate hierarchy. Id. "The significant classification... is between those employees with sufficient managerial authority to bind the corporat[ion] ... as distinguished
from those employees having no general powers of superintendence over the whole or a
particular part of the business." Id.; see Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724,
730-31 (9th Cir. 1969); In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 204 F. 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1913). Thus, if
the corporate employee having privity or knowledge is not a managerial agent, and if the
managerial agents themselves are unaware, the corporation may assert the Fire Statute immunity. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 1969). See

generally 3
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§ 42 (L Hall 7th rev. ed. 1980).

287 U.S. at 424-25.
0 Id. at 425; see Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U.S. 638, 646 (1891); Walker v. The
Transp. Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150, 154-55 (1865); American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo
Hadjipatera, 81 F. Supp. 438, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), modified, 194 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1951);
The Doris Kellogg, 18 F. Supp. 159, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 94 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1938)
(per curiam).
61 287 U.S. at 425-28. In rejecting the argument that the protection of the Fire Statute
is implicitly subject to the owner's overriding obligation to make his vessel seaworthy, the
Earle Court stated:
The fire statute, in terms, relieves the owners from liability "unless such fire
is caused by the design or neglect of such owner." The statute makes no other
exception from the complete immunity granted. The cargo-owners do not make
the broad contention that the statute affords no protection to the vessel owner if
the fire was caused by unseaworthiness existing at the commencement of the voyage. Their contention is that ... the duty of the owner to make the ship seaworthy before starting on her voyage is non-delegable, and if the unseaworthiness
could have been discovered by due diligence there was necessarily neglect of the
vessel-owner.
:9

The courts have been careful not to thwart the purpose of the fire statute by
interpreting as "neglect" of the owners the breach of what in other connections is
held to be a non-delegable duty.
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Statute gave immunity to owners for a fire loss due to unseaworthiness existing at the commencement of the voyage provided
that there was no personal neglect on the part of the owner. Lack
of personal neglect which excused the owner was deemed broad
enough to encompass not only the neglect which immediately
fire, but also negligence concerning the vessel's
occasioned the
6 2
seaworthiness.
The Earle Court's broad construction of the Fire Statute
clearly effectuates the underlying congressional intention of the

Act.6 3 Moreover, the interpretation of the "design or neglect"
clause given in Earle appears to comport with the judiciary's conception of the "privity or knowledge" clause."
Delegation of Duty
Another important question is the extent to which an owner
may delegate his duty to provide a seaworthy ship. Under the Limitation of Liability Act, an owner may delegate his duties as they
relate to seaworthiness6 5 to his master and crew, 66 as well as to sevId. at 425-26 (footnotes omitted). See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co.,
230 F.2d 346, 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956).
"2Even with the passage of COGSA, the holdings of the various circuits were substantially within the guidelines established by Earle.See, e.g., Albina Engine & Mach. Works,
Inc. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 295 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 1961); Auto Ins. Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 224 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955); Fidelity-Phenix Fire
Ins. Co. v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 205 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
915 (1953); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Accinanto, Ltd., 199 F.2d 134, 146 (4th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953); American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera,
194 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1948); Hoskyn & Co. v. Silver Line,
Ltd., 143 F.2d 462, 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 767 (1944).
e3 Congress enacted the Fire Statute to shield shipowners from loss caused by fire,
thereby "extinguish[ing] fire claims as an incident of contracts of carriage." Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kawasaki Zosenjo, 320 U.S. 249, 254 (1943). In accordance
with this legislative intent to exonerate shipowners from fire loss, the statutory language has
been liberally construed by the Court to provide complete rather than limited immunity
from liability. Id.; see 3 BENEDICT ON ADmIRALTY, supra note 58, § 182, at 1-6 n.5.
"See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
65 Clearly, the owner has a duty to see that the vessel is seaworthy. See, e.g., The Silvia,
171 U.S. 462, 464 (1898). Seaworthiness requires, among other things, that the ship be properly manned, Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson, 398 F.2d 204, 210 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 983 (1968), equipped, In re Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 179 F. Supp. 227, 236 (D. Del.
1959), aff'd, 289 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1961); The T.J. Hooper, 53 F. Supp. 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y.
1931), af'd, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932), maintained, Coleman v.
Jahncke Serv., Inc., 341 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 974 (1966), and
fit to do the job that it is intended to do. Moreover, courts and commentators have stated
that the owner warrants the seaworthiness of his vessel. See Demsey & Assoc., Inc. v. S.S.
Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1016 (2d Cir. 1972); Trans-Amazanica Iquitos, S.A. v. Georgia S.S.
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eral independent contractors, such as surveyors, loading specialists,
ship repairers, and stevedores.17 So long as the owner selects permissible delegates, and exercises care in ascertaining their competence, he will not lose the protection of the Act because of a delegate's negligence.6 8 Thus, unseaworthiness will not bar limitation if
the owner has hired competent personnel to man, inspect, load, or
repair the vessel in the absence of knowledge of their negligence. If
the owner knew or should have known, however, that the delegates
were incompetent, or if he selected a managing agent or supervisory employee, the priority requirement would be satisfied, and the
owner will lose his protection under the Act."
Similarly, the test for determining when the design or neglect
of another will be imputed to the owner has been held to be the
same under the Fire Statute as under the Limitation Act.7 0 An
Co., 335 F. Supp. 935, 941 (S.D. Ga. 1971); CANFImD & DAZEL, supra note 31, at 70. Thus,

the vessel bears liability for loss to the goods if, when she commenced the voyage, she was
unseaworthy, "and if the loss would not have arisen but for that unseaworthiness." Id. The
warranty, however, "does not require an absolutely perfect ship [since] the true criterion is
that degree of fitness which the average prudent and careful owner requires of his vessel at

the commencement of the voyage." Id.
" In re Brasea, Inc., 583 F.2d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1969); Shaver Transp. Co. v. Chamberlain, 399 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1968); The Yungay, 58 F.2d 352, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). In
Yungay, the court clearly stated:
The limitation acts entitle the owner to a limitation of his liability for losses
suffered 'without his privity or knowledge, meaning actual and not constructive
The act would fail of its purpose, the encouragement
privity or knowledge ....
of the business of navigation, if full liability should be visited upon owners
through the creation ...

of nondelegable duties.

58 F.2d at 356.
" See Petition of Long, 439 F.2d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1971), wherein the court stated
that the shipowner could limit his liability for the loss of cargo upon a showing that overloading of his ship by stevedores occurred without his privity or knowledge. Id.
" See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 412 (1943); The Princess Sophia, 278 F. 180, 189
(W.D. Wash. 1921), afl'd, 61 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 604 (1933); Van
Eyken v. Erie Ry., 117 F. 712, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1902). In Coryell, the Supreme Court noted
that a shipowner who "selects competent men to store and inspect a vessel" may avail himself of the benefit of limited liability under the Act. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 412
(1943).
"' Coleman v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 341 F.2d 956, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 974 (1966); Texas & Gulf S.S. Co. v. Parker, 263 F. 864, 867-68 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 253 U.S. 488 (1920).
70 Compare Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410-11 (1943) with Waterman S.S. Co. v.
Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1969). As in the case of the Limitation of Liability
Act, the decision as to whether or not to impute the neglect of an employee to the owner
under the Fire Statute hinges upon the employee's posture. Generally, the neglect of managing agents and supervisory employees will be imputed to the vessel owner, but that of lower
level employees will not. See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410-11 (1943); Craig v. Conti-
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owner, therefore, will not be deprived of the protection of the Fire
Statute unless he fails to ascertain the competence of his delegates,
or unless the negligent delegate is a managing agent or supervisory
employee.7 1 Thus an owner has been found liable for the negligence of a port captain,7 2 a marine superintendent,7 and a port
engineer.7 4 The negligent acts of the officers and crew, however,
have not been imputed to the owner.7 5 Moreover, it has been held
that it is permissible under the Fire Statute to delegate the duty to
make a vessel seaworthy.7 e For example, owners have enjoyed the
protection of the Fire Statute despite the negligence of a chief engineer,7 7 an independent surveyor,7 8 or a repair yard.79 A caveat is

necessary, however, since some of the cases have indicated that the
owner has a continuing duty to supervise any delegation of duties
relating to seaworthiness.8 0 Yet, it should be emphasized that
neither the Fire Statute nor the Limitation of-Liability Act refers,
either expressly or impliedly, to a duty of due diligence to make a
vessel seaworthy."'
nental Ins. Co., 141 U.S. 638, 646-47 (1891); Walker v. Transportation Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
150, 153 (1865).
71 See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
712E.g., American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 499, 502
(9th Cir. 1959). The court held that "[i]f the Port Captain had acted with reasonable
promptitude, the carrier would have been exonerated and no question as to the amount of
damages would have arisen, for there would have then been no liability." Id. (emphasis
added).
73 E.g., Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 269 F.2d 68, 71-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 933 (1959); In re Great Lakes Transit Corp., 81 F.2d 441, 443-44 (6th Cir.
1936).
74 E.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1947). The
Brasileiro court held that a port engineer's negligence properly could be imputed to the
shipowner since his word as to the condition of ships and the need for repairs was final. Id.
75 See notes 58-59 supra.
76 Earle & Stoddart v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1932); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 230 F.2d 346, 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 832 (1956).
77 E.g., Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, 287 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1932).
7 E.g., Consumers Import Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 133 F.2d 781, 78687 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 320 U.S. 249 (1943).
70 E.g., The Older, 65 F.2d 359, 359 (2d Cir. 1933); Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. The S.S.
Robert Luckenbach, 184 F. Supp. 134, 139 (D. Or. 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961).
00 See, e.g., Bank Line, Ltd. v. Porter, 25 F.2d 843, 844-45 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 623 (1928)..
81See notes 20 & 28 supra.
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Burden of Proof
One of the most salient differences of interpretation between
the Limitation Act and the Fire Statute relates to the burden of
proof. With respect to the Limitation Act, the courts have consistently placed the burden of establishing lack of privity and knowledge on the shipowner. 2 Of course, the claimant has the burden of
establishing the liability of the shipowner in the first instance. 83
Although the burden of proof under the Fire Statute has never
been explained precisely by the Supreme Court, the majority view
is that carriers must make out a prima facie defense under the Fire
Statute by establishing that the claimant's damage was caused by
fire. 4 The burden of going forward then shifts to the cargo owner
to prove that the loss was caused by the design or neglect of the
shipowner. 5
THE COGSA

STANDARD

Section 4(2)(b) of COGSA exempts a shipowner from liability
for fire loss except where the fire was caused by his "actual fault or
privity." 8 Significantly, this standard has been interpreted to have
the same meaning as the "design or neglect" standard embodied in
See In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 1972); Valliant & Co. v.
Rayonier, Inc., 140 F.2d 589, 591 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 748 (1944); Henson v.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 68 F.2d 144, 145 (6th Cir. 1933); Christopher v. Grueby, 40
F.2d 8, 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 876 (1930).
8 See In re G.B.R.M.S. Caldas, 350 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd mem., 485
F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1973), wherein the court stated that the "[c]laimant must prove that the
destruction or loss was proximately caused by negligence on the vessel and once negligence
has been shown to be the cause, the burden shifts to the shipowner to demonstrate that he
comes within the statutory exemption." Id.; see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, at
2

§ 10-25.
See Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480
F.2d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1973); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 205
F.2d 886, 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953); Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. The
S.S. Robert Luckenbach, 184 F. Supp. 134, 139 (D. Or. 1960), aff'd sub nom., Albina Engine
& Machine Works, Inc. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 295 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961). But cf.
Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 269 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1959) (upon showing of
negligent operation of ship, burden of proof of availability of Fire Statute exemption is on
shipowner). See also Thede, Statutory Limitations (Other Than Harter and COGSA) of
Carriers'Liability to Cargo-Limitationof Liability and the Fire Statute, 45 TtL. L. REv.
959, 985 (1971).
86 See Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480
F.2d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1973).
8646 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976); see, e.g., In re Skibs A/S Jolund, 250 F.2d 777, 784 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 933 (1958). See generally American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Tokyo
Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1959) (dictum).
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the Fire Statute.8 7 Unless an owner is personally responsible for
the start of a fire, has delegated his care of the ship to a known
incompetent, or has selected a negligent managing agent or supervisory employee, he will enjoy the fire exemption protections of
COGSA.5 8 Other sections of COGSA, however, condition limitation
of liability upon the carrier's exercise of "due diligence" to make
his ship seaworthy. 9 There is some question, therefore, whether
actual fault or privity is the sole standard of care.90 If the fire exemption clause is read alone, exoneration is not conditioned upon
the owner's exercise of due diligence.
The Sunkist case appears to require shipowners to demonstrate their exercise of due diligence before exoneration from liability can be claimed.9 1 Resolution of the due diligence issue, therefore, is imperative for there is a great difference between the two
standards. In particular, actual fault requires personal negligence,
whereas the exercise of due diligence is a nondelegable duty.92
See, e.g., Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre,
480 F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1973); Ionmar Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Central of Ga. R. Co.,
471 F. Supp. 942, 952 (S.D. Ga. 1979); cf. American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Tokyo Marine & Fire
Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1959) (dictum) ("exemptions under both acts are considered identical as to a shipowner-carrier").
"' See American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1959); In re Skibs A/S Jolund v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 250 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 933 (1957); 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
89 COGSA provides that the carrier will not be liable for damages resulting from unseaworthiness unless he fails to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. See 46
U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976). This standard requires that the carrier exercise the same degree of
87

care as would the reasonably prudent vessel owner. 2A

BENEDICT ON ADmnRALTY,

supra note

58, at § 82. The duty to exercise due diligence to make one's vessel seaworthy is not delegable. E.g., Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vapores, S.A.,
388 F.2d 434, 439 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); John Penny & Sons, Ltd. v.
MV Swivel, 266 F. Supp. 302, 307 (D. Mass. 1967); G. Gu.MoRm & C. BLACK, supra note 4 at
§ 3-27; Villareal, The Concept of Due Diligence in Maritime Law, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 763,
767 (1971). Thus, the carrier cannot escape liability through COGSA's protections by showing that he exercised due care in selecting a delegate. Rather, it must be shown that these
agents exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. See International Nay. Co. v.
Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co., 181 U.S. 218, 225 (1901) (decided under due diligence standard of
Harter Act).
1o See, e.g., Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327,
1335-36 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980); In re Liberty Shipping Corp.,
509 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1975); American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 81 F.
Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), modified, 194 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978
(1951); Accinanto, Ltd. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 99 F. Supp. 261 (D. Md. 1951), modified on other grounds, 199 F.2d 134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1951).
91 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327, 1335-36 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
92 When courts speak of the nondelegability of the duty to exercise due diligence, they
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Thus, if a due diligence standard is read into the fire exemption
clause, a shipowner could not escape liability for the negligence of
an independent contractor to whom he had delegated duties relating to seaworthiness.
All of the relevant American cases prior to Sunkist implicitly
have taken the position that the fire exemption clause is independent of the rest of COGSA.9 The Second Circuit's decision in Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et
Cyprien Fabre94 is illustrative. In Asbestos Corp., a defective oil
pump caused a fire to break out in the engineroom of the defendant's vessel.9 5 Since all of the ship's fire fighting equipment's was
either located in or had to be operated from the engineroom, it
quickly became impossible to utilize the fire fighting equipment.
Six hours later, the fire spread to the ship's cargo holds.97 At trial,
the shipowner contended that he had used due diligence to make
the ship seaworthy and that, in any event, it was exonerated from
mean that the carrier cannot discharge the obligation imposed by this standard by simply
delegating it to a competent agent. 2A BENEDICT ON ADMRALTY, supra note 58, at § 84.
Thus, the delegate's lack of due diligence will be imputed to the vessel owner, and any
protection dependent on that standard of care will be lost. See, e.g., Ore S.S. Corp. v. D/S
A/S Hassel, 137 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1943); In re Thebes Shipping, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 436,
458 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Indeed, courts have recognized that the duty to exercise due diligence
is "a heavy burden." See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. S.S. Giovannella D'Amico, 297 F. Supp.
699 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The "actual fault or privity" test is a less onerous standard from the
carrier's perspective, for it requires a showing that the shipowner was personally negligent
before a claim for exoneration can be defeated. Thus, negligence of servants cannot deprive
the vessel owner of the protections made conditional under this standard. See, e.g., J. Howard Smith, Inc. v. S.S. Maranon, 501 F.2d 1275, 1277 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
975 (1975); Bubble Up Int'l Ltd. v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 458 F. Supp. 1100, 1105
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"SSee, e.g., Automobile Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 224 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955); cf. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Flota Mercante Del Estado,
205 F.2d 886, 886-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953) (Fire Statute is independent of the "safety statute"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "It]he fire statute
...relieves the owners from liability 'unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect of
such owner.' The statute makes no other exception from the complete immunity granted."
Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420, 425 (1932).
480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973).
9'Id. at 670. The fire began when the oil pump began to spray oil onto the manifold of
a propulsion engine. Id.
" Id. at 670-71. The fire pumps were controlled from the engineroom. Id. at 671 n.3.
Additionally, the portable fire extinguishers were located there, as were the controls for the
steam smothering system. Id.
11 Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 345 F.
Supp. 814, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afl'd, 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973). It took approximately 6
hours for the fire to spread from the engineroom to the bridge and finally to the cargo holds.
345 F. Supp. at 817.
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liability under the Fire Statute and COGSA.9 8 According to the
district court, the threshold issue was whether the defendant had
exercised due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage
to make the ship seaworthy.9 The court concluded that the defendant had not, reasoning that the fire would not have spread to the

cargo holds if all of the fire fighting equipment and systems had
not been located in the engineroom. 100 In addition, the court found

that the lack of fire fighting equipment amounted to "design or
neglect" and "privity or knowledge." 10 1 The district court, therefore, ruled that the shipowners were not exempt from liability
under either COGSA or the Fire Statute.10 2
In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit
agreed that the cargo damage resulted from the carrier's failure to
exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.10 3 The court's
affirmance, however, was not based on the shipowner's lack of due
diligence. The court clearly recognized that the due diligence stan-

dard was distinct from "design or neglect" or "actual fault or privity. 10° 4 Rather, the rationale for the court's conclusion that the carrier was not entitled to the protections of the fire exemption clause
or the Fire Statute was based upon the carrier's personal
10 5
negligence.
345 F. Supp. at 816.
Id. The district judge noted that the cargo owners established a prima facie case
under COGSA by showing that the carrier received the cargo in good order but that upon
delivery the goods were damaged. Id. at 820. The court stated that the burden then shifted
to the carrier to show that the damage was not due to negligence or that it fell within one of
COGSA's exoneration provisions. Id.
100 Id. at 823.
101 Id. The court noted that in failing to provide fire fighting equipment which could
"

have been controlled from outside the engineroom, the shipowners "display[ed] a total disregard for minimal protection of cargo and rendered the [vessel] unseaworthy." Id. This, the
court reasoned, rose to the level of "design or neglect" and "privity or knowledge." Id.
102

Id.

103 480 F.2d at 670. The Second Circuit called the district court's opinion "a clear com-

prehensive and detailed statement of both the facts and the controlling law." Id.
104 The Asbestos court treated unseaworthiness and due diligence as threshold issues.
See id. Finding a lack of due diligence, the court moved to the next issue-the vessel owners' claim that they were entitled to exoneration under the Fire Statute and the fire exemption clause. Id. at 672.
1o See id. at 673. The Second Circuit noted that it is the carrier's burden to demonstrate his own due diligence. Id. at 672. The court stated, however, that the Fire Statute and
the fire exemption clause shift this burden to the cargo owner. Id. at 672-73. Thus, "[i]f the
carrier shows that the damage was caused by fire, the shipper must prove that the carrier's
negligence caused the damage." Id. at 673. Additional support for this reading of Asbestos
can be found by looking to the district judge's opinion in the case, since the Second Circuit
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The decision in Asbestos Corp. is hardly persuasive authority
for reading a due diligence requirement into the fire exemption
clause. The application of the due diligence standard by a Canadian court to its own analog to the COGSA fire clause, however,
lends credence to the opposite point of view. In Maxine Footwear
Co. v. CanadianGovernment Merchant Marine Ltd., 06 the British
Privy Council held that a carrier's duty to exercise due diligence is
an overriding obligation under Canada's version of the fire exemption clause. 10 7 An employee in Maxine, acting under instruction
from the ship's master, caused a fire by applying a blow torch to
cork insulation around a frozen scupper pipe.108 After attempts to
control the fire failed, the master was forced to scuttle the ship and
the plaintiff's cargo was lost. 109 The trial court and the Canadian
Supreme Court both found that the shipowners were entitled to
the benefits of the exoneration provisions in the Canadian statute. 1 0 The Privy Council reversed, however, finding that the unseaworthiness of the vessel was the proximate cause of the fire and
the resultant loss of cargo."' Most significantly, the Council rejected the notion that the fire exemption clause provides complete
and unconditional exoneration for fire loss without any inquiry
into seaworthiness or due diligence." 2 Hence, the defenses of management error and lack of fault or privity are not available to the
expressly endorsed his statement of the facts and law. Id. at 670-71; see note 103 supra. It is
clear that the district judge in Asbestos was not imposing a due diligence prerequisite to the

COGSA fire exemption. Indeed, he stated that COGSA's "fault or privity" standard is
equivalent to the Fire Statute's "design or neglect" standard. 345 F. Supp. at 821. The district court explicitly recognized that "design or neglect" means the personal negligence of
the owner. Id. at 820. In contrast, the due diligence standard encompasses not only personal
neglect, but the crew's negligence as well. See note 89 and accompanying text supra. It
seems clear, therefore, that the district judge was not conditioning the protections of either
the Fire Statute or the COGSA fire clause on a carrier's due diligence.
[1959] A.C. 589 (P.C.) (Can.).
107 See id. at 602-03. The Privy Council stated that if the overriding obligation to exer-

cise due diligence is not fulfilled, and damage proximately results, none of the immunities
mentioned in the Canadian version of COGSA would protect the carrier. See id. at 602-03.

These "immunities" are virtually the same as those provided for in the American COGSA.
Compare 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (1976) with Carriage of Goods by Water Act, CAN. REv. STAT.,
c. C-15, Sched., Art. IV, r.2 (1970). Like COGSA, the Canadian statute provides that the

carrier must exercise due diligence to make his ship seaworthy, and that if this duty is
discharged there shall be no liability for unseaworthiness. See id. at Art. I, r.l(a).
108 [1959] A.C. at 593.

Id.
110 Id. at 601.
109

" Id. at 603-04.
112

Id. at 602-03.
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carrier who has failed to exercise due diligence to make his vessel
seaworthy.113 Moreover, the Privy Council held that the owner's
personal diligence was not enough to escape liability for unseaworthiness, since the applicable statute also required that due
diligence be exercised
by those to whom the owner delegated his
1 14
responsibility.

No case in the United States prior to Sunkist, however, ever
held that the fire exemption clause of COGSA incorporates a due
diligence standard."' Moreover, the analogy to Maxine Footwear
is far from perfect. At this point, therefore, a careful scrutiny of
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines Ltd.

6

is

appropriate.
SUNKIST GROWERS: AN INAPPROPRIATE DEPARTURE FROM

TRADITION

In Sunkist, a cargo of fresh lemons owned by the plaintiff,
Sunkist, was loaded in good order and condition aboard the Gladiola for refrigerated transportation to Poland. 17 Shortly before departure from California, Sunkist was advised that the vessel would
be stopping in Ecuador to load bananas; it did not object, however,

to this deviation in course.118 Upon the ship's arrival in Ecuador, a
fire broke out in the engineroom." 9 The blaze was caused by the
separation of a fitting and ferrule in the low pressure diesel fuel
line of the vessel's number one generator which permitted diesel

fuel oil to spray onto the hot surfaces of the numbers one and two
generators. 20 Upon hearing an alarm, an extra third engineer proceeded directly from the unmanned engineroom to the generator
113 Id. The Council noted that if the contention of the carrier was correct that due

diligence is not at issue in fire cases-then there would be "a very strong case for saying that
there was no fault or privity of the carrier." Id. at 602.
11 Id. at 602. In holding that an owner's personal diligence does not vitiate liability for
unseaworthiness where his agent does not use due diligence, the Privy Council is in accord
with the weight of American authority. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
, See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
11 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
117 603 F.2d at 1329. Sunkist conducted their shipping transactions with Salen, a Swedish corporation, pursuant to a 3-year contract wherein the latter agreed to transport Sunkist's citrus cargoes on a weekly basis. Id. The Gladiola, a general cargo vessel, was owned
by the claimant Adelaide Shipping Lines, a British corporation, and chartered by Salen. Id.
n28Id.
119Id.
120

Id.
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flat. 12 1 While the flow of oil could have been stopped easily at that

point by turning a valve or by pulling a nearby pin, the engineer
failed to do either. The second engineer arrived on the scene, but
he too failed to close either valve. 12 2 Consequently, the fire spread

to the oil in the bilges and along the inflammable butyl-insulated
cable, the room filled with dense smoke, and it became necessary
to evacuate. 123 The master ordered the remotely controlled fire extinguisher system into action, but the fire was already out of control and could not be extinguished until three days later.1 24 Although the cargo of lemons had not been damaged by the fire, the
refrigeration system had been destroyed. 125 It became necessary to
find local refrigeration storage or markets, or to provide for the
transshipment of the cargo. 126 When these alternatives could not
be effected, the lemons, valued at over $350,000, were given to the
127
military authorities for distribution to the people.
The district court held that both the shipowner and the time
charterer were exonerated from liability under both the Fire Statute and the fire exemption clause of COGSA. 125 While the district

court found that the vessel could have been made safer through
better maintenance, by modification of existing equipment, or by
adding additional equipment,1 2 the court noted that neither a pru-

dent owner nor charterer would have made these modifications or
additions.130 Moreover, the district court found that a particular
type of ferrule should have been maintained in a particular joint,
but that the failure to maintain the proper ferrule was the fault of
the crew rather than the failure of the owner.$1 Finally, the court
Id.
Id. at 1330. Characterizing the failure of the two engineers to extinguish the fire "as
a Shakespearean comedy of errors, with a result akin to one of his tragedies," the court
attributed it to the engineers' inexperience in fire-fighting as well as the lack of proper instruction. Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
122

122

125 Id.

Id.
Id.
128 Id.; see Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines Ltd., [1976] A.M.C. 2597,
2603-04 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012
(1980).
129 [1976] A.M.C. at 2602.
130 Id. The court noted that the prudent vessel owner, "[a]rmed only with foresight,"
could not be expected to make the modifications set forth which were, in part, products of
hindsight. Id.
128

127

131 Id. at 2602-03.
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noted that the shipowner's case was not damaged by the fact that
the crew should have been instructed specifically on how to deal
with engineroom fires. 132
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
court addressed two issues which are critical to future application
of the fire liability exoneration provisions: whether the defendants
were required to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy as a prerequisite to claiming a fire exemption under COGSA;
and, if so, whether the defendants failed to exercise due diligence
by not maintaining proper equipment or by failing to man the vessel with a crew trained in fighting engineroom fires. 13 Determining
that the findings of the district court were "elastic" and "equivocal,'

34

the court of appeals answered both questions in the affir-

mative and reversed.3 5 Specifically, the court held that the vessel
owner and charterer were required to use due diligence to make
the vessel seaworthy in order to obtain the benefits of both the
Fire Statute and the COGSA fire exemption clause, and that they
failed to carry their burden of proving that they had satisfied that
standard. 3 ' According to the court of appeals, the failure to comply with COGSA before and at the inception of the voyage was
twofold. First, the carrier and charterer violated Lloyd's Rule by
failing to provide a flanged Serto ferrule fitting in the low compression fuel joint. 3 7 Second, the carrier and charterer failed to use
"I Id. at 2603. The court noted that a reasonable vessel owner or charterer would have
relied on the certification of its crew members with respect to their prior firefighting experience and knowledge. Id.
1:3603 F.2d at 1330.
"1' See id. at 1334. The court of appeals' treatment of the district court's findings appears to violate rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under rule 52(a),
"[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, while the findings of fact by the trial court
need not be deemed conclusive by an appellate court, the party challenging the findings has
a substantial burden to overcome. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2585, at 729 (1971). Indeed, a reviewing court should not reverse a finding of
fact by the trial court unless it is firmly convinced that a mistake occurred at the trial level.
See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333.U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See generally 9 C. WRmGHT & A. MILLER, supra, at § 2585. The court of appeals' reference to the
district court's "elastic" and "equivocal" findings, and its substitution of its own findings
are not in keeping with the requirements of rule 52(a).
135603 F.2d at 1340-41.

23 Id.

Id. at 1334 & n.2. Lloyd's Rule, Chapter E. § 312 provides: "Transfer, suction and
other low pressure oil pipes and all pipes passing through oil storage tanks are to be made of
cast iron or steel, having flanged joints suitable for a working pressure of not less than 7
17
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due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy by failing to man the
vessel with a crew properly trained in engineroom fire fighting. In
particular, the crew failed to utilize the proper equipment to shut
off the oil and failed to utilize properly the portable fire extinguisher, all of which evidenced a lack of fundamental preparation
and knowledge of the various means available to efficiently control
l3 8
fire.
The Sunkist decision obviously marks a departure from the
traditional understanding of fire liability limitations in this century. Unfortunately, the court's limited analysis was inadequate to
arrive at a proper decision.'-" Since the appellees raised both the
Fire Statute and the COGSA fire exemption clause as defenses, a
detailed analysis of the issues relevant to each of these must be
undertaken.
The Fire Statute Defense
Three questions are pertinent to determining the applicability
of the Fire Statute: (1) Was the fire caused by the design or neglect
of the owner? (2) Is the Fire Statute conditioned upon the vessel
owner's use of due diligence before or at the inception of the voyage? and (3) Who has the burden of proving liability under the
Fire Statute?
The district court in Sunkist found that the vessel could have
been made safer by possible modification, maintenance, or additional equipment. 140 A prudent owner, the court found, would not
necessarily have made most of the modifications. 1 1 Moreover, the
court determined that the failure to maintain or replace the defective ferrule was due to the negligence of the crew rather than the
fault of the owner in failing to notice the latent defect. 142 There
KG/CM 2 (100 lb./in. 2)." 603 F.2d at 1334, n.2. According to the court of appeals, the failure
to provide a flanged Serto ferrule fitting was not only a clear violation of Lloyd's Rule, but

ultimately caused the fire by allowing the diesel oil to spray upon the hot generators. Id. at
1334.
138 603 F.2d at 1334-35.
139See notes 163-202 and accompanying text infra.
140 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., [1976] A.M.C. 2597, 2602
(N.D. Cal.), reu'd, 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
141 [1976] A.M.C. at 2602. The district judge implied that any modifications made
through "reasonable foresight would not have prevented the fire." Id.
142 Id. at 2602-03. The district court found that even an experienced engineer would not
have noticed, through "normal and reasonable external inspection" that the wrong type of
ferrule had been installed. Id. at 2602.
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also was no specific finding that such maintenance had been delegated to the chief engineer.143 The shipowner, therefore, should not
have been held responsible for the crew's negligence. The Fire
Statute protects the owner in such circumstances unless it is found
that he knew or should have known that the crew selected was incompetent. 4 4 The trial court specifically found, however, that the
ship's engineers were competent. 1 45 Moreover, the licensed crew's

prior fire fighting experience and training belied the fact that it
was incompetent. 14 Therefore, no acceptable theory substantiates

the attribution of design or neglect to the Sunkist defendants.
Due diligence to make a vessel seaworthy, either before or at
the inception of a voyage, is not a condition to exoneration from
liability under the Fire Statute. 47 The statute's only exception is
expressed in terms of design or neglect. If a requirement of due
diligence is to be read into the statute, therefore, it must be done
so by COGSA. Yet, it is still not clear whether the COGSA fire
exemption clause is conditioned upon the carrier's due diligence. 48
Furthermore, by its terms, COGSA specifically saves the Fire Statute from repeal. 49 Indeed, if due diligence were to be applied to
the Fire Statute, the exoneration provision would be stripped of its
own long-established standards.

50

Thus, due diligence should have

no applicability to the Fire Statute-the Sunkist court overlooked
this basic premise.
Traditionally, when courts considered the Fire Statute in the
context of common-law liability, the burden of proving the shipowner's design or neglect was placed squarely on the cargo owner. 15' The courts did not diverge from this approach until after
COGSA cases began to arise. It was in these cases that the courts
began to intertwine burden of proof principles with the imposition
143 See id. at 2598-2603.
114See notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra.
145 [1976] A.M.C. at 2601.
141 Id. The ship's engineers had been trained in fire fighting. Id. Indeed, in order to
obtain certification, a number of the engineers were required to attend a 4-day course in
practical training. Id.
14 See 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976).
148 See notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
149 By its own terms, COGSA "[does] not affect the rights and obligations of the carrier" under the Fire Statute. 46 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976).
110 The concept of due diligence imposes a higher standard of care on the vessel owner
than does the design or neglect test. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
151 See, e.g., The Older, 65 F.2d 359, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1933); Thede, supra note 84, at
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of a due diligence prerequisite to exemption under COGSA's fire
clause. 15 2 It is submitted that the burden of proof under the Fire
Statute should not be affected by COGSA, particularly since due
diligence is not a valid condition precedent to exoneration under
the 1851 statute.
The COGSA Defense
The Sunkist court addressed two controversial issues in considering COGSA's application: (1) whether the vessel owner must
exercise due diligence before he can claim protection of COGSA's
fire exemption; and (2) whether there was indeed a lack of due
diligence in Sunkist.15' The Ninth Circuit read COGSA as imposing on the carrier an overriding obligation to exercise due diligence
to make his ship seaworthy.1 5 Thus, the court reasoned, if this
duty was breached, proximately resulting in fire and cargo loss, the
vessel owner would be "at fault." '5 5 He, therefore, would be unable
to benefit from the fire exemption clause of COGSA.' 58 This conclusion is faulty in that it misconstrues established judicial precedent.' 57 Additionally, the Sunkist court's construction of the clause
deviates from Congress' purpose in enacting the statute.' 58 The
specific purpose of COGSA was to ensure that the United States
merchant marine would remain a viable competitor among the
shipping nations of the world.' 5 9 Since nearly all maritime countries had fire statutes, it indeed would have been foolhardy for
Congress to have weakened shipowner protections in this area.
Thus, while the Sunkist court correctly recognized that COGSA
represented an attempt to balance the conflicting interests be"" See, e.g., Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Gov't Merchant Marine, Ltd. [1959]
A.C. 589, 602-03.
'53 603 F.2d at 1330.
154

Id. at 1337-38.

151Id. at 1341.
156 Id.
157 See notes 163-202 and accompanying text infra.
1'58See Hearings on S. 1152 Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries,74th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1936). In these hearings, it was stated that COGSA would
exempt the carrier from liability for certain types of loss without requiring an initial showing of due diligence. Id. Although some of these exemptions were said to require a showing
of due diligence if unseaworthiness contributed to the loss, this was not the case regarding
COGSA's fire clause. Id.
I59 See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra. See generally G. GlMoRE & C.
BLACK, supra note 4, at §§ 3-22, 3-23.
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tween "'cargo" and "hull,"160 it is submitted that the panel tipped
the scales too far in the wrong direction at the expense of our
merchant marine. Congress did not intend such a dramatic shift in
emphasis from the statutory schemes of the Harter and Limitation
of Liability Acts when it enacted COGSA.161
Even if the Ninth Circuit had been correct in its interpretation of the fire exemption clause, its determination that due diligence was absent from the outset of the voyage was erroneous. The
application of due diligence should be related directly to the cause
of the fire and not to the configuration of the owner's vessel or the
training of his crew. Given the finding that the defect in the ferrule
was latent and not reported, one must wonder what level of diligence the Sunkist court believed was due. Thus, while the Ninth
Circuit's ruling that the duty may not be delegated to escape liability is a reasonable one, where the delegate acts with due diligence,
there is no omission to impute to the owner. 61
LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR SUNKIST

The Ninth Circuit's decision to make applicability of the protection of the 1851 Fire Statute contingent upon a showing of due
diligence is unsound in light of prior decisions. The Sunkist court
relied on the Canadian Maxine Footwear case, calling it "highly
persuasive."1 83 While Maxine Footwear appears to set an arguably
applicable precedent for the Sunkist decision insofar as COGSA is
concerned, 6 there are several key factors which distinguish the
160 The Sunkist Court characterized COGSA as "part of an overall plan to settle the
adverse interests of carriers and cargo shippers." 603 F.2d at 1333.
161 See Hearings on S. 1152, supra note 158, at 63. Indeed, it seems that Congress
wished to afford carriers more protection than was granted under the Harter Act. See id.
162See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
16 603 F.2d at 1337; see notes 106-14 and accompanying text supra.
6 Using a Canadian case as precedent for an American decision is not inherently suspect. Indeed, this approach would ordinarily be proper in view of the similarity of the two
COGSA statutes--both derived from the Hague Rules. See notes 34-39 and accompanying
text supra. See generally 51 Stat. 233 (1924), reprinted in A. KNAUTH, supra note 25. As
one commentator noted:
Our courts are inclined to follow the decisions of the House of Lords in shipping cases because of the importance of uniformity in the decisions of two such
important maritime nations, unless our courts have already decided the paticular
[sic] issue or some question of public policy is envolved [sic]. The Hague Rules,
which are the basis of both the Canadian Act and the United States Act, were
designed to be an international code and the language of the Sections of both Acts
under consideration is identical
2A BENEDxCT ON ADMmLTy, supra note 58, at § 147 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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two cases. First, Canada, unlike the United States and Great Britain, has no Fire Statute. There is, however, a fire exemption clause
in the Canadian counterpart to COGSA. 6 5 Consequently, assuming
arguendo that due diligence is required under the Canadian statute, Maxine Footwearis persuasive authority for the Sunkist decision only with respect to the fire exemption clause in COGSA. It is
of no aid in interpreting the standard of care required under the
Fire Statute-a factor which the Sunkist court failed to explain.
Of course, if COGSA was intended to supercede the Fire Statute,
since the latter was enacted 85 years earlier, the Sunkist court
would have been correct in relying on Maxine Footwear.16 COGSA
explicitly states, however, that the Fire Statute survives and is applicable according to its terms.1 17 Second, unlike in the Canadian
"precedent," the fire in Sunkist occurred well after the voyage had
begun.

68

The Ninth Circuit in Sunkist also relied on the Second Circuit's decision in Asbestos Corp.6 " as precedent for reading a due
diligence requirement into the Fire Statute.1 70 This is simply incor-

rect; the Second Circuit's finding of liability under the Fire Statute
was predicated on the negligence of the individuals in authority,
not upon a lack of due diligence. 7 1 The Sunkist court's improper
Thus, using the Canadian case as precedent would only be appropriate absent American
authority or countervailing public policy considerations. It is submitted, however, that the
legislative history of the American COGSA raises unique issues which undercut the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on Canadian law.
'6
See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
16 See note 164 supra.
'6
See 46 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976); note 42 and accompanying text supra.
In Maxine Footwear,the Privy Council implied that the duty to exercise due diligence lasts "until the vessel starts on her voyage." [1959] A.C. at 603. In Sunkist, the fire
began more than a week after the vessel set sail. 603 F.2d at 1329. Thus, even under Canadian authority, liability would not attach.
169 Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie De Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480 F.2d
669 (2d Cir. 1973); see notes 94-105 and accompanying text supra.
270 603 F.2d at 1335. The Ninth Circuit accused the district court of "misreading"
Asbestos. See id.
"I1See 480 F.2d at 670-73. The Asbestos court addressed the issues of "due diligence"
and "design or neglect" in two separate sections of its opinion. See id. The Court agreed
with the district court's finding that the vessel owners failed to exercise due diligence "in
equipping the vessel adequately to fight an engine room fire." Id. at 671. This finding was
significant because it meant that the vessel owners could not take advantage of the "unseaworthiness" exemption of COGSA. Cf. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976) (no liability for damages
"resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence"). At that point, the
appellants had to rely on the Fire Statute or COGSA's fire exemption. This reliance was
misplaced, however, because the court found negligence on their part. 480 F.2d at 672.
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reliance on Asbestos Corp. was compounded by its failure to accept
the Second Circuit's formulation of the burden of proof. The Asbestos Corp. opinion states that COGSA ordinarily places the burden of proving due diligence on the carrier, but that the burden
shifts to the shipper when the fire exemption clause is invoked. 1 2
The Sunkist court expressly refused to follow this rule, however,
stating that it was a gratuitous assertion and entirely insignificant
to the Asbestos Corp. decision.17 3
The Ninth Circuit also relied on one of its prior decisions,
New York Merchandise Co. v. Liberty Shipping Corp.,17 4 for support. In Liberty Shipping, another fire at sea case, the district
court found that the cause of the fire was "unknown. 1 1 5 The
Ninth Circuit, however, reasoning that the fire spread because of
the owner's lack of due diligence, held that the protections of the
Fire Statute and COGSA fire exemption clause were inapplicable.1 76 While Sunkist is consistent with this proposition, the principle itself is faulty. Indeed, the Liberty Shipping panel missed the
point of the fire exoneration provisions. Concededly, where a fire is
caused by the shipowner's neglect, liability should attach. Where,
however, the owner's mere lack of due diligence enabled the fire to
spread, statutory exoneration should remain available. Indeed,
both the Fire Statute and the fire exemption clause appear to be
quite precise in requiring that fire be caused by owner negligence
before exoneration will be foreclosed.17 7 Thus, Liberty Shipping
and, therefore, Sunkist's reliance on it, must be regarded as
questionable.
In Albina Engine & Machine Workers, Inc. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp.,17 8 the Ninth Circuit applied the Fire Statute in a traditional manner. In Sunkist, however, the court chose to distinguish
this case, relying instead on Liberty Shipping for support. It is
172

Id. at 672-73.

17

603 F.2d at 1335-36.

509 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1250. The district court attributed the cargo loss to fire and unseaworthiness.
Id. While the cause of the fire was unknown, the unseaworthiness was said to exist in two
respects. First, the crew did not have sufficient knowledge of the ship's firefighting system.
Id. Second, the cargo holds could not be sealed off because of a mechanical defect. Id.
178 Id. at 1252.
177 See 46 U.S.C. §§ 182, 1304(2)(b) (1976). But see Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v.
Flota Mercante Del Estado, 205 F.2d 886, 888-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915
(1953); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 105 F.2d 160, 165-66 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 611 (1939).
178 295 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961).
174
75
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submitted that this was erroneous. In Albina, a fire occurred while
repairs were being made to a ladder in the ship's hold by a crew
employed by an independent contractor.1 7 9 When they began to
weld the ladder, "a spark or piece of burning metal flew into the
cargo of burlap bags."1 80 Because the fire fighting equipment was
being repaired, the fire was not extinguished until after the local
fire department arrived. The principal theory of liability sought to
be applied to the owner was that its port engineer had delegated to
the chief engineer the task of ensuring that alternate fire equipment was in place.181 The court not only conceded that the delegation of this duty was proper, but it also held that the owner was
not liable because the delegate was not a managing officer.18 2 A second asserted basis for recovery was that the marine superintendent
should have cleared the cargo from the hold before the welding
began. The district court, however, also found the superintendent
to be a mere subordinate employee, and not a managerial official. 83 Thus, because the owner was not personally negligent, the
Fire Statute exonerated him from liability. 1 "
The Sunkist court asserted that Albina was distinguishable in
that the "design or neglect" in Sunkist was that of managing officers or supervisory employees. 185 It is asserted that this premise is
incorrect. The "neglect" of the owner was said to be twofold: the
failure to provide a proper fitting in the fuel joint and the failure
to man the vessel with a properly trained crew prior to the commencement of the voyage.1 86 The district court, however, found
that the crew was negligent in failing to report the replacement
fitting.1 87 There was no neglect in the owner's failure to notice that
a new fitting was installed.188 Additionally, even if the superintendent engineer could be considered a managing agent, there was no
"neglect," for he was not informed of the maintenance problem.
Id. at 621.
Id. The fire caused by the stray spark resulted in damage both to the ship and its
cargo. Id.
179
180

181 Id.
182 Id.
1" Id. at 622. The district court's finding, upheld by the Ninth Circuit, was that the
superintendent was "'a mere subordinate employee' and not a managerial officer." Id.
184 Id.
18

603 F.2d at 1336.

188 Id. at 1334-35.
187

188

[1976] A.M.C. 2597, 2600-01.
Id.
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Finally, the ship's log, routinely inspected by high level management, did not reflect the need for repairs.18 9 Thus, Sunkist is on all
fours with the Albina case. Both cases involved shipowners who,
with their privy, had no basis on which to believe the vessels were
unseaworthy. There being no basis for a finding of neglect, the Fire
Statute's protection should have been available to the owner in
Sunkist-under the authority of the Albina decision.
The court also attempted to distinguish A/S J. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi v. Accinanto, Ltd.,190 by stating that Ludwig
primarily involved stevedore negligence and, therefore, the exemption provisions of COGSA were not in issue there.191 In Ludwig,
dangerous cargo was destroyed by fire because of spontaneous
combustion. The court held that the carrier could not be held liable for "neglect" if predicated on a theory that stowage of cargo is
a nondelegable duty. Thus, the negligence in the performance of
the stevedore's tasks was not to be imputed to the carrier under
the Fire Statute or in determining whether it exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. 92 Actually, this case militates
against the Ninth Circuit's view that the Fire Statute must be conditioned on COGSA's due diligence standard because it demonstrates that a vessel owner may properly delegate the stowage duty
to an independent stevedore without losing the protection of the
Fire Statute.1 9 3 The same should be true of the duty to use due
diligence to make the ship seaworthy. If the vessel owner delegates
this duty, he should not have to give up his protection under the
Fire Statute. COGSA imposes both duties upon the shipowner,""
but the Sunkist court failed to indicate why delegation of one duty
carries such a price, while delegation of the other does not.
American Tobacco Co. v. Katingo Hadjipatera95 was also
"distinguished" in Sunkist when the Ninth Circuit asserted that
the case focused almost exclusively on the Fire Statute, affording
9 ' The American Tobacco case inCOGSA only passing treatment."
volved both the Fire Statute and the COGSA fire exemption
189 Id.
190

199 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953).

191 603 F.2d at 1340.
192 199 F.2d at 143.
'93
19

Id.

See 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1)(a), (2) (1976).

190 81 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), modified, 194 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,

343 U.S. 978 (1952).
10 See 603 F.2d at 1340.
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clause, for the suit named not only the owners as defendants but
the voyage charterers as well. The inclusion of voyage charterers
must invoke considerations of COGSA. The court determined that
the vessel owner was not liable because the cargo owner failed to
satisfy his burden of proof. There was no evidence that the shipowner had personal knowledge of the improper stowage and under
neither statute is the knowledge of the master imputed to the
shipowner. 197
Finally, the Sunkist panel distinguished the Supreme Court's
decision in Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line,
Ltd., 98 which held that a failure to exercise due diligence to make
a vessel seaworthy will not preclude exoneration under the Fire
Statute. The distinction emphasized by the Ninth Circuit was that
Earle & Stoddart had been decided under the Harter Act, which
has no fire exemption clause, as does COGSA. 99 To distinguish
Earle & Stoddart on this ground is to depart from congressional
intent, for under Sunkist, exoneration under the Fire Statute
would depend upon whether COGSA or the Harter Act was applicable. Congress surely intended COGSA to apply to ocean shipping, but it wished to retain, except for explicitly stated differences, all of the features of the Harter Act in the later statute. 00
Thus, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Earle &
Stoddart should apply to the Fire Statute not only in Harter Act
cases, but also where COGSA applies.
Even if Earle & Stoddart can be distinguished on the ground
that it pertains only to the Harter Act, then the issues raised
therein should be resolved in the context of COGSA. For example,
it must be decided whether Congress intended the COGSA fire exemption clause to be subject to due diligence.201 If so, then the
problem arises whether the Fire Statute, not expressly subject to
due diligence, must be interpreted to include such a condition despite Congress' expressed intention that the legislation was to survive unmodified by COGSA. 0 2 It is this commentator's view that
7 194
98 287
1" 603
200 See
201 See
202 See

F.2d at 449.
U.S. 240 (1932).
F.2d at 1340.
notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
note 158 supra.
text accompanying note 42 supra. Indeed, one commentator noted:

In Earle & Stoddart,Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd. the Supreme Court
held that a shipowner's breach of its non-delegable duty of due diligence with
respect to seaworthiness did not deprive it of the right to exoneration under the
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neither question should be answered in the affirmative.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: No REPRIEVE FOR SUNKIST

Perhaps COGSA's greatest contribution to the merchant
marine is that it extends exoneration from fire liability to time
charterers, who enjoy no such protection under the Fire Statute. 20 3
The Sunkist court, however, without giving adequate consideration
to their position, imposed a due diligence requirement upon time
charterers. 204 Unlike the shipowner, the time charterer's sole interest is limited to loading and stowage of cargo. 05 It is usually not

involved in the navigation of a ship or the selection of its master or
crew. It is the owner who is obliged to keep the ship in proper
repair. Indeed, in many instances, the time charterer found liable
based upon failure to exercise due diligence can obtain indemnifiFire Statute. Neglect of the owner in the sense of the Fire Statute and in the sense
of COGSA means, in the case of a corporate owner, negligence of its managing
officers or agents. Negligence of the ship's officers or crew does not deprive the
owner of its right to exoneration, although, of course, such negligence will support
a finding of a lack of due diligence with respect to unseaworthiness. The Supreme
Court's Earle & Stoddart decision was rendered prior to the enactment of
COGSA, but since COGSA does not narrow an owner's rights under the Fire Statute that decision still states the applicable rule.
5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 129, 133-34 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
203 See 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976). The term "carrier," in 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976), has
been defined to include time charterers-who are, therefore, exonerated from fire liability.
See, e.g., Demsey & Associates, Inc. v. S.S. Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1972).
Pursuant to the Fire Statute, however, time charterers are not entitled to limitation of
liabilty. See In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 409 F.2d 1013, 1015 (2d Cir. 1969). Conversely,
the limitation of liability provisions of the Fire Statute have been held to be applicable to
bareboat charterers. See Allen N. Spooner & Son, Inc. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 206 F.
Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 314 F.2d 753 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 819 (1963); Tracy Towing Line, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 105 F. Supp. 910, 913
(D.N.J. 1952).
Under a time charter arrangement, an owner provides a fully equipped ship to the time
charterer in return for monthly compensation. 2B BENEDICT ON AVmnm
mY, supra note 58,
at § 10. Moreover, since the owner does not surrender all possession and control of the
vessel, the liability for negligence in piloting as well as the obligation to provide insurance of
the vessel rests entirely upon the owner. Id. In contrast, the bareboat charterer is vested
with pro hac vice ownership, subject to the duties, rights and liabilities that arise out of the
incidents of ownership. See Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412 (1963); Marr Enterprises, Inc. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1977); Williams v. McAllister Bros. Inc., 534 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, a bareboat charterer is liable for
damage to the vessel. Seaboard Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Moran Towing Corp., 154 F.2d 399,
402 (2d Cir. 1946).
24 603 F.2d at 1338.
05 See 2B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 58, at § 10-11.
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cation from the owner.20 6 This is because the owner has an obligation, under a time charter arrangement, to supply a seaworthy ship
at the beginning of each voyage.207 It is submitted, however, that

this possibility of indemnification should provide no excuse for
misplaced liability in the first instance. Although COGSA was intended to extend protection to time charterers, the Sunkist panel
afforded them no more protection than they enjoyed under the
1851 Act.
CONCLUSION

In arriving at its determination that neither the Fire Statute
nor the COGSA fire exemption clause are available to carriers who
do not exercise due diligence to make their vessel seaworthy, the
Sunkist court ignored or "distinguished" a number of American
precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in Earle &
Stoddart.0 8 Instead, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Canadian precedent, without considering that that nation has no independent
Fire Statute, as does the United States.209 Thus, the court failed to
focus upon the interrelationship between the COSGA fire exemption clause and the 1851 Fire Statute. Indeed, in construing both
pieces of legislation, the court followed the Canadian interpretation of their statute rather than emphasizing congressional intent
or several important policy considerations.
Although one could argue that P & I insurance policies will
render the Sunkist decision of little practical significance, it is
strongly suggested that such is not the case. While it is true that
the carrier's insurer will pay for the loss based upon an experience
premium structure, the indirect effect of such payouts is significant. Since P & I insurance is written with an understanding that
the carrier has less risk of liability because of the statutory exoneration provisions, the Sunkist decision is dangerous, from a practical perspective, because of its inflationary potential. If the Sunkist
208 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., 542 F.2d 145, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1976);
Nichimen Co. v. M.V. Farland, 462 F.2d 319, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1972); Demsey & Associates v.
S.S. Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1017 (2d Cir. 1972).
210 Indeed, courts have held that there is an implied warranty, in most time charter
arrangements, that the vessel is seaworthy at the commencement of each voyage. See The
Julia Luckenbach, 235 F. 388 (2d Cir. 1916) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Luckenbach v.
W.J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918); Coca Cola Co. v. SIS Norholt, 333
F. Supp. 946, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 2B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 58, at 53.
20I See notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra.
201 See notes 163-168 and accompanying text supra.
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principles become entrenched in the law, carriers' rates will rise
substantially to cover the increase in exposure to liability.
The Sunkist decision represents a severe retreat in the protections previously enjoyed by carriers. If Congress feels that the Fire
Statute has outlived its usefulness, it is for that body to repeal the
legislation. If the courts do so in a piecemeal fashion, much of the
legal stability and uniformity necessary for the survival of the
American merchant marine will disappear.

